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ABSTRACT
This paper makes three primary contributions. First, we demonstrate the usefulness of general
equilibrium models as tools with which to draw policy implications for policies implemented in
practice only as small-scale social experiments. Second, we illustrate the usefulness of social
experiments as a tool to evaluate equilibrium models. In particular, we calibrate our model using
only data on an experimental control group and from general data sets, and then use it to predict (in
partial equilibrium) the outcomes experienced by an experimental treatment group. We find that it
predicts these outcomes remarkably well. Third, we apply our methodology to the evaluation of the
Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), a policy providing generous financial incentives for
Income Assistance (IA) recipients to obtain stable employment. This policy is similar to many other
policies designed to "make work pay" currently under debate or in place in the US, the UK and
elsewhere. Our results reveal several important feedback effects associated with the SSP policy;
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Many potential policies have been evaluated using social experiments, where small subsets
of the population are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, the treatment
group is subjected to the potential policy reform and the diﬀerence in outcomes between
the groups provides an estimate of the mean impact of the policy. The resulting treatment
eﬀects literature provides useful estimates of the eﬀect of treatment on those individuals
participating in the program within an experiment, where typically a small number of in-
dividuals are aﬀected by the policy. However, such estimates may be of limited usefulness
if the policy evaluated in the experiment is implemented in general. A growing body of re-
search indicates that a policy may have very diﬀerent implications when it is implemented
for the general population than when it is implemented on only a small number of partici-
pants for evaluation purposes.
As outlined in Calmfors (1994) and elsewhere, such general equilibrium eﬀects of pro-
grams represent a critical component of social cost-beneﬁt analysis. Consider two examples
of such eﬀects. First, programs may have indirect eﬀects on both participants and non-
participants by changing the equilibrium of the labor market. These eﬀects violate the
“stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA) invoked to justify partial equilibrium
analysis. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) consider increasing subsidies to college tu-
ition and ﬁnd that the resulting increase in the number of individuals who attend college
has the eﬀect of increasing the supply of college graduates and reducing their wages. In
this case, the eﬀect of the tuition policy depends on the number of college graduates in the
labor market.
Second, programs may directly aﬀect those who are not treated within the program. As
discussed by Heckman and Smith (1998), the standard treatment eﬀects literature assumes
1that the outcomes for individuals not treated by the program within an experiment are the
same as the outcomes non-participants would experience if the program were implemented
more widely. This need not be the case. For example, consider the US Unemployment
Insurance Bonus experiments, where individuals starting a spell of unemployment were
oﬀered a cash payment if they obtained employment within a limited time period. Davidson
and Woodbury (1993) estimate the displacement eﬀects of the bonus program that would
result from changes in the search behavior of all workers in the labor market. In particular,
the bonus increases the gain to employment for workers eligible to receive it, resulting
in increased search eﬀort and employment. Some of the increase in employment will be
in jobs that would otherwise have been held by workers not eligible for the bonus. This
displacement directly aﬀects a subset of the labor force not treated within the program.
Existing studies, such as those mentioned above, indicate that the equilibrium eﬀects of
large-scale policies may be substantial. With regard to the college tuition subsidies studied
by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), they estimate that the general equilibrium eﬀects
on enrollment rates are 10 times smaller than those obtained from a partial equilibrium
analysis. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate that the displacement of UI-ineligible
workers oﬀsets 30-60 percent of the gross employment eﬀect of the bonus program. This has
a strong eﬀect on the estimated net impact of the program from society’s point of view. In
recent work, Blundell, Costa Dias, and Meghir (2003) consider the long-run eﬀects of a large-
scale wage subsidy policy for low-skill workers. They ﬁnd that the general equilibrium eﬀects
of the policy on unemployment are opposite in sign to the predictions of a partial equilibrium
analysis. Overall, the literature shows that general equilibrium program evaluations can lead
to very diﬀerent conclusions regarding the cost-beneﬁt performance of labor market policies.
Studying the potential general equilibrium eﬀects that may result from implementing a
small-scale social experiment as a large-scale policy is diﬃcult without the use of an equi-
2librium model. However, the degree of conﬁdence that can be placed in policy experiments
generated within a model depends to a large extent on how well the model captures the
behavior of the individuals aﬀected by the policy.
The goal of our paper is to combine the advantages of the literature that attempts to
evaluate potential policies through social experiments with the literature that evaluates
potential policies through model experiments. We construct a dynamic, equilibrium model
that is well-suited for conducting labor market policy experiments and we use the model as
a tool for evaluating social programs. Our model is based on the search model of Davidson
and Woodbury (1993). Within the model, the amount of time required to ﬁnd a job can be
reduced by increased search eﬀort on the part of the worker. Once workers and ﬁrms meet,
they bargain over wages in an environment where wages reﬂect the value of the match and
the value of the outside options faced by both parties. This framework is ideally suited
for many equilibrium program evaluations, as it explicitly considers the eﬀect of changes in
ﬁnancial incentives introduced by social programs on the intensity with which individuals
search for jobs and on the process by which wages are determined in the labor market.
In addition to the matching and wage determination process, our model incorporates key
features of the Income Assistance (IA) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs, both of
which constitute important aspects of the economic context and are likely to have important
feedback eﬀects on the labor market.
We demonstrate the usefulness of social experiments as tools to evaluate equilibrium
models. In this respect, our paper serves as an analogue to work by Lalonde (1986) and
others, where experiments are used as a benchmark against which to assess the performance
of partial equilibrium non-experimental estimators.1 In particular, we test our model by
examining its ability to match the observed behavior of the experimental treatment group
1See, e.g., Smith and Todd (2004) for a summary of this literature.
3when calibrated using only the experimental control group (and external data).
In general, calibrated models are tested by examining the extent to which they can
replicate features of the economy. Our exercise is more stringent in the sense that the
model must also be able to match the behavior observed in the data following a policy
change without exploiting the variation introduced by the policy change itself. We are able
to replicate the outcomes produced by a social experiment without using the data from
the experimental treatment group. The ability of the model to do so greatly increases
our conﬁdence in the results from our general equilibrium program evaluation. In parallel
work, Todd and Wolpin (2003) use the data from the experimental evaluation of Mexico’s
PROGRESA program to test a partial equilibrium, structural, dynamic model of fertility
and child schooling using a similar approach. Their model does a good job of matching the
experimental impacts from PROGRESA.
We apply our methodology to the equilibrium evaluation of the Canadian Self-Suﬃciency
Project (SSP), a policy designed to provide incentives for individuals on income assistance to
leave the system for full-time employment.2 Similar, but less generous, income supplement
programs have been studied in the United States; see Auspos, Miller, and Hunter (2000) on
the Minnesota Family Investment Program and Bos, Huston, Granger, Duncan, Brock, and
McLoyd (1999) on the Wisconsin New Hope program. Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001)
provide an overview of the experimental literature and compare these programs to other
approaches. These programs, along with policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) in the US and the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK, aim to “make
work pay” by subsidizing low-wage work.
The SSP provides ﬁnancial incentives by oﬀering a temporary earnings supplement to
2A growing literature looks at various aspects of the Self-Suﬃciency Project. See, e.g., Card and Hyslop
(2002), Ferrall (2000) and Kamionka and Lacroix (2002).
4single parents on IA.3 Individuals must remain on IA twelve months to become eligible
for the earnings supplement; once they do, they receive a supplement if they obtain full-
time employment (at least 30 hours per week) and leave IA within the following twelve
months. The supplement equals half the diﬀerence between the individual’s earnings and a
province-speciﬁc cutoﬀ level in each month.
Our model incorporates the main features of the SSP. In particular, the model allows
for time limits in determining eligibility for receipt of the supplement, consistent with the
one-year time limit in the experiment, allows individuals to receive the earnings supplement
for up to three years while employed, and allows the earnings supplement to depend on the
wages received by eligible recipients. The full-time work requirement is the sole omission,
due to the fact that our model does not include the hours choice. In addition, our model
incorporates the time limitations on entry and exit in the Canadian unemployment insur-
ance4 program and captures the interactions between IA, UI and the minimum wage in the
labor market.
After constructing the model, we adopt the following strategy. First, we calibrate the
equilibrium model in the absence of the program using publicly available, non-experimental
data and data on the experimental control group. The parameters calibrated in the ﬁrst
stage include the discount rate, search friction parameters, and exogenous job separation
rates: parameters that are, in theory, invariant to changes in the income assistance program.
Using the calibrated model, we simulate a model control group.
Second, we simulate the SSP experiment within our calibrated model using the param-
3In Canada, IA provides mean-tested transfers to persons of working age that do not depend on past
earnings or employment but do depend on family size and composition. Canada also has an unemployment
insurance system (similar to that in the US but more generous) that pays beneﬁts that depend on past
earnings and employment (but not on family size or composition) to workers with suﬃcient past employment.
Unemployment insurance is the more generous program, so a worker eligible for both will collect that ﬁrst
until his or her eligibility runs out, and then switch to IA.
4The Canadian UI program is presently called Employment Insurance; we use the standard international
term here for clarity.
5eters obtained in the ﬁrst stage. A simulated treatment group is constructed by imposing
the Self-Suﬃciency Project in partial equilibrium.
Third, we compare the impacts from the simulated treatment and control groups to
those from the SSP social experiment, in order to determine how well our model replicates
the observed treatment eﬀects. The results from this exercise lend strong support to our
parsimonious model, as the simulated treatment group outcomes match the experimental
data quite closely. In particular, the IA-to-work transition rates for the simulated treatment
group during the 36 months following random assignment are virtually the same as those
observed in the experimental data. We are also able to match the delayed exit eﬀects of a
second randomized experiment that oﬀered SSP to new IA recipients.
Fourth, we re-calibrate the model using data on the low-skill population as a whole, and
simulate the equilibrium eﬀects that result from introducing the SSP as a general policy for
all IA recipients, not just single mothers. Our model allows us to quantify the displacement,
wage and delayed exit eﬀects of the SSP and provides a more complete picture of the
potential implications of implementing the SSP as policy than does the partial equilibrium
experimental evaluation.
Four main results emerge from the equilibrium program evaluation. First, introducing
an earnings supplement to the income assistance program has implications for unemployed
workers, as the increase in employment for IA recipients coincides with a decrease in re-
employment rates for those individuals receiving UI beneﬁts. As a result, the overall em-
ployment level does not change after the introduction of the policy. Second, although the
introduction of an earnings supplement increases the rate of exits to employment from IA,
it does so at lower equilibrium wages, as workers are willing to accept lower starting wages
so as to beneﬁt from the supplement payments. Surprisingly, the wages of other workers in
the economy increase slightly, as the increased value of IA due to the introduction of the
6earnings supplement increases the fraction of the match surplus transferred to the worker.
This result is primarily due to the fact that the minimum wage limits the ability of ﬁrms
to extract the surplus generated by the supplement from the worker. Third, the simulation
results indicate the presence of entry and delayed exit eﬀects, as the transition rate into
the IA program from UI increases and a higher fraction of individuals remain on IA long
enough to qualify for the supplement after the policy change. Fourth, taken together, the
equilibrium eﬀects reverse the cost-beneﬁt conclusions from the partial equilibrium analysis
and further illustrate the importance of equilibrium program evaluation.
2 The Model
In this section, we present the model of the labor market that we use to conduct equilib-
rium program evaluations. Three segments of the market are incorporated in the model:
individuals may be employed (E), unemployed and receiving UI beneﬁts (U) or on income
assistance (A).5 This feature of the model allows us to consider how workers, unemployed
individuals and income assistance recipients interact in the labor market. The model builds
on the equilibrium search model of Davidson and Woodbury (1993), where individuals max-
imize expected lifetime income by choosing their labor market state and the intensity with
which they search for work if not employed.6 We extend Davidson and Woodbury (1993)
to incorporate the income assistance program, minimum wages, and time limitations for
entry to and exit from the unemployment insurance program. Workers bargain with ﬁrms
over wages that depend on the tenure of the match, the minimum wage, and on the outside
options of both parties. Through this channel, the model generates predictions regarding
the way starting wages vary depending on the state from which the individual enters em-
5Throughout this paper we use the term unemployed to mean collecting UI beneﬁts. In the model, all
jobless individuals are actively seeking employment; they are distinguished by whether they are receiving
unemployment beneﬁts or income assistance beneﬁts.
6The model of Davidson and Woodbury (1993) is based on work by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982)
and Pissarides (1984).
7ployment. It is further assumed that the value of the match surplus increases with job
tenure, generating on-the-job wage growth in the model.
Our model incorporates key features of typical unemployment insurance and income
assistance programs.7 First, individuals face time limitations regarding entry to and exit
from the unemployment insurance system. Individuals who enter employment from income
assistance or who have exhausted their unemployment beneﬁts become eligible to receive
unemployment beneﬁts after I months of employment. The number of months of beneﬁt
eligibility subsequently increases by one month for each additional month of employment,
from a minimum of u months up to a maximum of ¯ u months. Workers who enter employment
with unused beneﬁts retain their unused beneﬁt months and accumulate additional months
with each month worked. Second, individuals who exhaust their UI beneﬁts and do not
secure a job are assumed to transit directly to income assistance. Finally, it is assumed that
individuals can remain on income assistance indeﬁnitely or transit to employment if they
contact a ﬁrm with a vacancy; income assistance recipients cannot transit directly from IA
to unemployment. In the following sections, we describe the problems faced by each type
of individual and by ﬁrms in the model.
2.1 Workers
The value of employment for a worker depends on her job tenure t and unemployment
insurance beneﬁt eligibility status i, where i ∈ {0,1,...,u,..., ¯ u}. The number of months an
individual with no beneﬁts must work in order to qualify for UI beneﬁts is I. For every
period an individual works beyond I, i increases by 1. The maximum number of beneﬁt
months an individual can accumulate is denoted ¯ u. If an individual is not working she would
7The program details correspond to those in place in Canada at the time of the SSP experiment. Our
model could easily be modiﬁed to correspond to the institutions present in the US, the UK, or other developed
countries.
8therefore be unemployed with i periods of beneﬁts remaining.8 With probability δ, jobs are
exogenously destroyed in the subsequent month, in which case workers transit to income
assistance if they have not yet qualiﬁed for UI beneﬁts (i = 0) and transit to unemployment
otherwise. With probability (1 − δ), workers remain employed in the next month.
It is assumed that individuals who return to work before their UI beneﬁts expire retain
their remaining UI beneﬁt eligibility. Finally, workers experience on-the-job wage growth
for a maximum of T months, after which the wage remains constant, where it is assumed
that T > ¯ u. The value function for a worker with outside option i and with job tenure t is:
V E(t,i) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
w(t,0) + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,0) + δV A] if t < I and i = 0,
w(t,0) + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,u) + δV U(u)] if t = I and i = 0,
w(t,i) + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,i + 1) + δV U(i + 1)] if 0 < i < ¯ u and I ≤ t < T,
w(t, ¯ u) + β[(1 − δ)V E(t, ¯ u) + δV U(¯ u)] if i = ¯ u and I ≤ t < T,
w(T, ¯ u) + β[(1 − δ)V E(T, ¯ u) + δV U(¯ u)] if t ≥ T,
(1)
where w(t,i) is the wage for a person with tenure t who has i months of UI beneﬁt eligibility
remaining, β is the discount rate, V A is the value of being on income assistance, and V U(i)
is the value of being unemployed with i periods of UI beneﬁts remaining.
2.2 IA Recipients
IA recipients receive beneﬁts (ba) and pay search costs ca[p(0)z] every month they remain
on IA, where z is the elasticity of search costs with respect to search eﬀort, ca is a parameter
capturing the disutility of search eﬀort, and p(i) is the optimal search eﬀort for individuals
with i months of UI beneﬁts remaining (and also the probability that such a worker contacts
a ﬁrm). The cost of search depends directly on the intensity with which individuals search.
In particular, for values of z > 1, the marginal cost of search increases as search eﬀort
increases. If IA recipients match with a ﬁrm, they transit to employment. Otherwise, they
8The UI system in our model embodies two simpliﬁcations relative to the system in place at the time
of the SSP experiment. First, months of employment do not cumulate across job spells in determining
beneﬁt eligibility. Second, months of beneﬁt eligibility last indeﬁnitely once obtained. Both simpliﬁcations
substantially reduce the state space of the model.
9remain on IA in the next period. The value function for an IA recipient is
V A = max
p(0)
n
ba − ca[p(0)z] + β
h
m(0)V E(1,0) + (1 − m(0))V A
io
, (2)
where m(0) is the match rate for IA recipients, which depends in part on the search eﬀort
p(0). The only reason IA recipients are not employed is because an employment opportunity
is not available and the only way an IA recipient can increase the likelihood of ﬁnding a job
is through increased search eﬀort.9
2.3 Unemployed Individuals
Unemployed agents receive exogenous UI beneﬁts (bu) and pay search costs cu[p(i)z]. We
make the simplifying assumption that unemployment beneﬁts are independent of the indi-
vidual’s pre-separation earnings. With probability m(i), individuals contact a ﬁrm with a
vacancy and transit to employment in the next month. If individuals remain unemployed in
the next month, it is assumed they continue to collect UI beneﬁts. Following the last month
of UI beneﬁt eligibility, individuals can either transit to employment, if a job opportunity
is available, or transit to IA. The value function for unemployed individuals with i months







bu − cu[p(i)z] + β
h
m(i)V E(1,i − 1) + (1 − m(i))V U(i − 1)
io
1 < i ≤ ¯ u,
maxp(i)
n
bu − cu[p(i)z] + β
h





Production takes place when there is a match between one ﬁrm and one worker; the number
of ﬁrms can alternatively be interpreted as the number of jobs in the economy. In every
9It is worth noting that we assume all income assistance recipients enter employment with zero tenure.
This assumption could be relaxed by assuming workers retain their experience when they enter income
assistance and then allowing their experience to depreciate over time. One implication of this extension
would be that the hazard of leaving IA would decline as the length of the IA spell increased. The drawback
of this extension is that it involves a large increase in the size of the state space. We thank Jim Walker for
this valuable suggestion.
10period, each ﬁrm has the option of ﬁlling a vacancy, if one exists, by hiring a worker or
keeping the vacancy open. If matched with a worker, ﬁrms earn proﬁts that depend on the
surplus generated by the match and pay wages, determined in equilibrium, that depend on
the worker’s outside options and the minimum wage. Proﬁts depend on the worker’s tenure
in order to allow match-speciﬁc capital to increase the productivity of the match over time.
Denote the surplus generated by a worker-ﬁrm pair of tenure t by S(t). With probability
δ the match separates and the ﬁrm is left with a vacancy in the following month. Denote
the proﬁts of a ﬁrm matched with a worker with outside option i, i ∈ {0,1,...,u,..., ¯ u} and
match tenure t as Π(t,i).
The expected discounted present value of proﬁts for matches of job tenure t and workers
with outside option i are
ΠE(t,i) = S(t)−w(t,i)+
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(t + 1,0)] if i = 0 and t < I,
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(t + 1,u)] if i = 0 and t = I,
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(t + 1,i + 1)] if 0 < i < ¯ u and t < T,
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(t + 1, ¯ u)] if i = ¯ u and t < T,
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(T, ¯ u)] if t ≥ T,
(4)
where match tenure beyond T no longer increases proﬁts.
If a ﬁrm has a vacancy, the value of the vacancy is determined by the probability of
meeting an unmatched worker, by the proﬁts the ﬁrm expects to make from the match, and
by the costs of posting a vacancy (ξ)
ΠV = −ξ + β












where q(i) is the probability a ﬁrm matches with a worker with outside option i. Firms
will post vacancies unless the expected proﬁt from doing so is negative. We assume free
entry, so that in the steady state equilibrium the number of ﬁrms in the economy will be
determined by the condition that the expected proﬁts from posting a vacancy equal zero.
112.5 Search Technology
Assume, for simplicity, that there is no on-the-job search in the economy. The probability
that a jobless individual receives a job oﬀer depends on the probability the worker contacts
a ﬁrm and the probability a ﬁrm has a vacancy.
2.5.1 Workers
The probability a ﬁrm has a vacancy is simply the total number of vacancies divided by the




If a ﬁrm has a vacancy, it will hire a worker and pay a wage which is the outcome of Nash
bargaining between the worker and the ﬁrm, discussed in detail below. Applications for
jobs arrive according to a Poisson process, where λ is the average number of applications
ﬁled by workers at each ﬁrm. Firms with more than one applicant randomly draw a worker




The conditional re-employment probabilities for unemployed workers and workers on income



















10Alternatively, we could let the length of a period tend to zero and work in continuous time, where there
is zero probability of more than one application arriving at a given time. As we wish to take the model to
data, we work with discrete periods.
12Workers determine the optimal level of search eﬀort by equating the marginal beneﬁt from
an increase in search eﬀort with its marginal cost.11 The optimal level of search eﬀort, for
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, 1 < i ≤ ¯ u.
2.5.2 Firms
From the ﬁrm’s perspective, the probabilities of matching with potential workers from
unemployment and IA equal the numbers of workers from unemployment and IA who









2.6 Equilibrium Wage Determination
After meeting in the labor market, a ﬁrm and a worker bargain over wages by making alter-
nating wage oﬀers until both sides ﬁnd the oﬀer acceptable. It is assumed that the parties
have equal bargaining power, but may have diﬀerent threat points. The equilibrium of this
game is the Nash cooperative bargaining solution and results in workers and ﬁrms splitting
the surplus of a match evenly. The surplus of the match from the worker’s perspective is the
diﬀerence between employment at the equilibrium wage and the worker’s outside option,
which depends on their current labor market state and program eligibility. The surplus
11In determining the marginal cost and beneﬁt of search eﬀort λ is held constant under the assumption
that each worker believes her impact is small relative to the labor market as a whole.
13from the perspective of the ﬁrm is the diﬀerence between the proﬁts the ﬁrm receives at
the equilibrium wage and the value of leaving the vacancy open. It is further assumed that
the bargaining process is constrained such that the wage can not fall below the minimum
wage w. The equilibrium wage, w(t,i), equals the solution to
[w(t,i) − w][(V E(t,i) − V i) − (ΠE(t,i) − ΠV )] = 0, (10)
subject to [w(t,i) − w] ≥ 0, where V i ∈ {V A,V U(i)} is the value of outside option i.
2.7 Steady State Conditions
Let E denote the steady state number of jobs occupied by workers and V the number of
vacancies. By deﬁnition, the total number of jobs in the labor market is equal to the total
number of occupied jobs and the total number of vacancies
F = E + V. (11)
Denote the total number of individuals in the labor market L. The total number of individ-
uals can be decomposed into three groups. The ﬁrst group consists of the employed, who






E(t,i) + ¯ E,
where ¯ E is the group of workers no longer experiencing on-the-job wage growth. The
second group, denoted A, consists of those on income assistance. The ﬁnal group, denoted






where U(i) indicates the number of unemployed persons with i periods of beneﬁts remaining.
The total number of individuals in the labor market is the sum of the three components
L = E + A + U. (12)
14Using these deﬁnitions, we can describe the conditions governing the steady state, where
the ﬂows in and out of every employment state must be equal over time. We now discuss
the steady state conditions for each state and eligibility combination in turn.
Employment
As above, let m(0) and m(i) denote the probabilities that IA recipients and unemployment
recipients with i periods of beneﬁts remaining, respectively, match with a ﬁrm. The ﬂow
into the ﬁrst period of employment includes those workers from IA and unemployment who
receive job oﬀers. They are indexed by their respective outside options as this will determine
their progression of beneﬁt entitlements. In subsequent periods, the inﬂow consists of
workers who were employed in the previous period and who were not exogenously separated
from their jobs. Formally,
E(1,0) = m(0)A + m(1)U(1);
E(1,i) = m(i + 1)U(i + 1), 0 < i < u;
E(t,0) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1,0), 1 < t < I and i = 0;
E(t,i) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1,i − 1), 1 < t < T and 0 < i ≤ ¯ u;
E(t, ¯ u) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1, ¯ u), 1 < t < T and i > ¯ u;
δ ¯ E = (1 − δ)E(T, ¯ u), t ≥ T.
Income Assistance
The ﬂow into IA includes those employed workers who were exogenously separated from
their jobs and ineligible for UI beneﬁts and unemployed workers no longer eligible for UI
beneﬁts. The ﬂow out of IA includes IA recipients who ﬁnd employment. The steady state




E(t,0) + (1 − m(1))U(1) = m(0)A. (13)
15Unemployment
Employed workers who are separated from their jobs and who are eligible for the maximum
months of UI beneﬁts ﬂow into the ﬁrst period of unemployment, U(¯ u). For U(i) where
0 < i < ¯ u, the inﬂow consists of unemployed workers from the previous period who did not
ﬁnd jobs, and workers separated from their jobs who qualify for less than the maximum
number of beneﬁt months. All workers ﬂow out of the unemployment state when beneﬁts








E(t,i − 1) + (1 − m(i + 1))U(i + 1) = U(i) if 0 < i < ¯ u. (14)
3 Combining Social Experiments and Structural Models for
Policy Evaluation
In this section, we describe a way to use social experiments in combination with structural
models to conduct equilibrium policy evaluations. The social experiment we consider is the
Canadian Self-Suﬃciency Project (SSP). We start by providing some details on the SSP
experiment and then outline our approach for conducting a general equilibrium evaluation
of the policy it embodied.12
The SSP experiment focused on long-term IA recipients.13 The universe for the experi-
ment was long-term single parent IA recipients ages 19 and older in British Columbia and
New Brunswick from November 1992 to March 1995. This universe was sampled at random.
Of those selected, 6,028 recipients volunteered to participate in the experiment and were
subsequently placed in treatment and control groups by random assignment.14 Individuals
12For comprehensive details on the Self-Suﬃciency Project, see Michalopoulous, et al. (2002).
13In particular, individuals had to receive IA in at least 11 months during the last year including the
current month in order to be included in the experiment.
14Kamionka and Lacroix (2002) examine the potential for randomization bias in the (partial equilibrium)
experimental impact estimates due to refusals to participate in the experiment. They ﬁnd evidence that the
published estimates understate the true impact of the SSP treatment.
16assigned to the treatment group were informed that they were to receive an earnings sup-
plement if they found a full-time (30 hours per week) job within one year and left income
assistance. The supplement received by members of the treatment group equaled one-half
of the distance between the earnings of the recipient and a benchmark earnings level, set at
$37,000 in British Columbia and at $30,000 in New Brunswick.15 Once eligible, individuals
could receive the supplement for up to three years. Individuals in the treatment group who
were not able to secure full-time employment within the twelve months following random
assignment become ineligible to receive the supplement. Individuals in the control group
were never eligible for the supplement.
The data contain information on 5,686 individuals from the main study who responded
to the 18 and 36-month follow-up surveys: 2,827 control group members and 2,859 treatment
group members. We imposed the following additional sample restrictions. First, 280 males
were dropped from the sample so that our analysis can focus on a homogeneous group (single
mothers) within the study.16 Second, 13 observations with inconsistent information in the
baseline survey were removed from the sample17 and 324 cases with missing information on
hours, earnings and other relevant variables in the 18-month follow-up data were eliminated.
An additional 476 cases with missing hours and earnings information in the 36-month follow-
up survey were also removed. The remaining sample contains 4,593 respondents, of whom
2,290 are members of the control group and 2,303 are members of the treatment group.18
This ﬁnal sample is the one we use for our policy evaluation.
The policy evaluation we undertake involves the following four stages:
15No other sources of income aﬀected the calculation of the earnings supplement.
16This is a relatively innocuous restriction, as 95% of the individuals in the SSP experiment are female.
17In particular, 7 individuals report their age at the baseline survey to be less than 19 and 6 individuals
report having no children. To be included in the study, individuals had to be single parents and at least 19
years of age.
18The control group contains 1,061 respondents from New Brunswick and 1,229 from British Columbia,
while the treatment group consists of 1,072 and 1,231 respondents from New Brunswick and British
Columbia, respectively.
171. Calibrate the model to be consistent with the population targeted in the SSP social
experiment using data on the experimental control group and external data sources.
This represents the model control group.
2. Introduce the Self-Suﬃciency Project in the model as an experiment in much the same
way it was implemented in reality. Simulate the behavioral eﬀects of the program in
partial equilibrium. This represents the model treatment group.
3. Compare the impact predicted by the model to the mean impact observed in the
data. This exercise provides evidence on how well the simulated experiment based on
our model replicates the impacts observed in the actual experiment. It is important
to emphasize that the partial equilibrium version of the model is the appropriate
comparison to the experiment because the experiment only aﬀected a small subset of
the economy and as such is not expected to have general equilibrium impacts.
4. If the model is able to capture the response of individuals to the experiment, then
proceed to simulate the equilibrium eﬀects of the policy in the model economy for the
target population of all low-skill workers.
We now discuss each of these steps in detail.
3.1 Constructing the model control group
In this section, we calibrate our model to data on single mothers without completed post-
secondary education and to data on the experimental control group. The model is calibrated
separately for British Columbia and New Brunswick, the two provinces in which the SSP
experiment was implemented. For the sake of brevity, and because they tell the same
substantive story, we only report results for British Columbia. A full set of results for New
18Brunswick is contained in a supplement that is available from the authors upon request.19
As the SSP experiment aﬀected only a small fraction of the population, we use a partial
equilibrium version of the model when generating simulated impacts from the model to
compare to the measured impacts from the actual experiment.
The parameters for the partial equilibrium version of the model include monthly income
assistance and unemployment beneﬁts (ba and bu, respectively), the wage proﬁle, the size
of the labor force (L), the vacancy rate (V/F), the job separation rate (δ), the discount
factor (β), and the search friction parameters (ca, cu, z). Table 2 reports the values used
for these parameters.
Monthly income assistance beneﬁts (ba) for single mothers (by province) are based on
the average IA beneﬁts for a single parent with one child during the 1990s, as reported in the
National Council of Welfare Reports (2002). Over this period the average monthly income
assistance beneﬁt was $927. UI beneﬁts (bu) are set at 55 per cent of average earnings.
In British Columbia, the earnings sample is limited to single mothers without completed
post-secondary education, as we are attempting to isolate that segment of the labor market
most similar to individuals receiving Income Assistance.20 The earnings data are based on
the usual hourly wage for the latter sub-population in British Columbia, as reported in the
monthly Labour Force Survey (1997-2000), assuming a 37.5 hour work week.21 Earnings,
IA beneﬁts and unemployment beneﬁts are all converted to 1992 dollars using the all-goods
CPI.22 The resulting monthly unemployment beneﬁt level is $952.
The model is homogeneous of degree zero in L and F; we can therefore normalize the
size of the labor force to 100 without loss of generality. The number of ﬁrms in the economy
19We focus on British Columbia in the paper rather than New Brunswick because a second component of
the SSP, the Entry Eﬀects experiment, was only carried out in British Columbia.
20Approximately 12% of the control group in the Self-Suﬃciency Project has some post-secondary educa-
tion.
21The Canadian Labour Force Survey is the analogue of the U.S. Current Population Survey.
22All ﬁgures are reported in 1992 Canadian dollars, where $1Cdn is presently equal to about $0.75US.
19will be estimated in the baseline model, and is identiﬁed using the observed vacancy rate in
the economy. Equation (11) determines V endogenously as a function of F and E. In order





The vacancy rate of 3.20 is taken from Galarneau et al. (2001) and is based on the average
for the retail trade and consumer services and labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing sectors,
both of which have average incomes similar to our sample. Therefore, using equation (11),





The job separation rate in the model (δ) is constant and can be directly estimated by
the average job tenure for single mothers in British Columbia with no completed post-
secondary education in the monthly Labour Force Survey (1990-2000). Job tenure is only
reported for individuals currently employed in the data; we do not have direct information
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Average job tenure in the Labour Force Survey (LFS 1990–2000) for this group is 46.68
months; therefore the monthly separation rate equals 0.0214.23
We use parameter estimates for our search cost function from Christensen, Lentz,
Mortensen, Neumann and Wervatz (2002), whose estimates of the elasticity of search costs
imply z = 1.8457, and we set the monthly discount factor β equal to 0.9835, corresponding
to an annual discount factor of 0.82 as in Davidson and Woodbury (1993). We assess the
sensitivity of our results to the values of these parameters in Section 6 below. The costs
23This measure of job tenure does not take quits into account. As a result, we may overestimate the job
separation rate as individuals moving between jobs because of quits report holding jobs of shorter durations.
20of search are allowed to diﬀer depending on whether individuals are receiving UI beneﬁts
or IA in order to capture the notion that searching may be less costly while unemployed.
For example, unemployed individuals may have access to better search technologies through
unemployment oﬃces than do IA recipients, which would be consistent with ca > cu.
To identify the search friction parameter ca we use the IA-to-work transition rate, m(0),
directly observed from the SSP control group. The data on the control group do not provide
information on the transition from unemployment to work necessary to identify the search
friction for this group (cu). Instead we use the search friction implied by the equilibrium
model calibrated to the low-skill labor force outlined below in Section 4.
Next we must specify the length of time a worker is eligible for unemployment insurance
beneﬁts. The length of the UI beneﬁt eligibility period in Canada depends on the unem-
ployment rate in the region of residence (British Columbia in this case) and on the worker’s
previous job tenure. We set the eligibility periods in the model according to the eligibility
rules in place during the 1990s. In British Columbia, this implies that a worker is entitled
to 5 months of beneﬁts after working 4 months, and to 10 months of beneﬁts after working
9 months or more (Lin 1998).
Finally, we set the minimum wage to 5.50 to match the legislated minimum wage in BC
at the beginning of the SSP experiment (Michalopoulos, Tattrie, Miller, Robins, Morris,
Gyarmati, Redcross, Foley, and Ford, 2002) and abstract from increases in the minimum
wage during the remainder of the experiment.24
After calibrating and simulating the model, we select those individuals who received
income assistance beneﬁts for at least 12 months. These individuals constitute the simulated
model control group.
24As discussed in Michalopoulos et al. (2002), the minimum wage in British Columbia increased several
times following random assignment, from $5.50 per hour in November 1992 to $7.15 in April 1998. We
repeated our analysis using the minimum wage in place at the end of the experiment and found the qualitative
results were the same. These results are available from the authors upon request.
213.2 Constructing the model treatment group
The following additions are made to the model to incorporate the Self-Suﬃciency Project.25
First, individuals on IA face several time constraints. IA recipients become eligible for SSP
after they have been on income assistance a minimum of 12 months. Once eligible for
SSP, individuals have 12 months to ﬁnd full-time employment in order to receive supple-
ment payments. If an individual secures a job before the eligibility period ends, she can
receive the supplement while employed for a maximum of 36 months. Consistent with the
SSP treatment implemented in the experiment, individuals have one eligibility period for
the treatment during their lifetimes. Once the eligibility period for the supplement pay-
ments expires, individuals return to the regular IA system. Second, eligible individuals who
ﬁnd work receive supplement payments that are a function of their wage upon obtaining
employment.
In order to mimic the experimental design of the SSP, we simulate the model in partial
equilibrium, using a ﬁxed wage proﬁle. In addition, we assume that (as in the experiment)
individuals do not anticipate the SSP treatment. We then solve for the re-employment prob-
abilities of a random sample of individuals on IA for at least 12 months. These individuals
constitute the simulated model treatment group.
3.3 Comparing the outcomes of the model experiment with the outcomes
of the social experiment
We now compare the predicted partial equilibrium eﬀects of SSP to those found in the SSP
experiment. This comparison represents an empirical test of our model, in the same spirit
as the comparisons of experimental and non-experimental partial equilibrium estimates in
LaLonde (1986) and other, similar papers in the treatment eﬀects literature. It is important
25Extending the model to include the SSP requires only minor changes. As such, we omit the details from
the paper, but describe them in an appendix available from the authors upon request.
22to emphasize that we do not use any information on the SSP treatment group in the
calibration of our model; we are interested in whether the model can predict the behavior
of the treatment group as an informal out-of-sample test.
Figure 1 compares the income assistance survival rates for the control and treatment
groups in the SSP experiment and in the model simulation.26 The basic pattern matches
the experimental data very well. Both the simulation and the experiment indicate that the
SSP increases the exit rate from income assistance to work substantially, with the impact
ending once eligibility expires. During the 12 months of program eligibility individuals
increase their search eﬀort and as a result transit to employment at a faster rate. Once the
12-month eligibility period is over, behavior reverts back to what it was in the absence of
the program, and the transition rate to employment returns to exactly what it was in the
absence of the treatment. It is very encouraging that the model correctly predicts not only
the basic pattern, but also matches the proportion of the treatment group remaining on
income assistance 36 months after random assignment.
As an additional test of how well the model predicts behavior we reproduce a second
experiment designed to estimate the extent of any delayed exit from income assistance that
results from the 12-month SSP qualiﬁcation period. The delayed exit experiment was a
separate experiment conducted on a sample of 3,315 single parents in their ﬁrst month
of IA receipt in the metropolitan area of Vancouver, British Columbia. This sample was
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, where the treatment group was told
that they would become eligible for the SSP program if they remained on IA for 12 months.
26To maintain comparability between our model and the experimental data we condition on not being
employed full-time in the month of random assignment and consider exits to full-time employment as the
end of an income assistance spell. In the model, receiving income assistance and employment are mutually
exclusive states, while in the data they are not. This is due to lags in the receipt of income assistance
payments, as well as the deﬁnition of full-time employment in the SSP data: “being employed full-time
during any portion of the month.” Conditioning on not being employed at random assignment gives us
an appropriate group for comparison with the model at the expense of dropping the 25 percent who were
employed.
23The diﬀerence between the fraction remaining on IA in the program and treatment groups
12 months after random assignment is estimated by Ford, Gyarmati, Foley, Tattrie and
Jimenez (2003) to be 3.9 percentage points with a standard error of 1.4. We conduct the
same experiment in our model in partial equilibrium. The model predicts a delayed exit
eﬀect of 4.3 percentage points in British Columbia, which is within one-third of the standard
error of the eﬀect estimated by Ford et al. (2003). The model is thus able to predict the
magnitude of the experimental delayed exit eﬀect quite well.
Comparing the model predictions with the experimental impacts we can see that the
model correctly predicts both the degree of delayed exit associated with the expectation
of receiving the SSP supplement in the future as well as the increased transition rate into
employment that becoming eligible for the SSP program induces. This comparison indicates
that the model captures the fundamental dynamics introduced by the SSP policy, which
increases our conﬁdence in the policy simulations that follow.
4 The Equilibrium Impacts of the SSP Policy
4.1 Calibrating the equilibrium model
In the equilibrium analysis, we focus on all IA recipients. We do this for two reasons. First,
it simpliﬁes our analysis substantially. If the SSP were limited to single mothers (or single
parents), the model would have to be extended to allow for two types of IA recipients: those
potentially eligible for the SSP supplement and all the rest. This extension would require a
large increase in the size of the state space. Second, if the SSP policy were adopted, it would
likely apply to all IA recipients rather than just to single parents, both for political reasons
related to equal treatment and to avoid incentive eﬀects of SSP on marital dissolution and
on out-of-wedlock childbearing.
The calibration of the general equilibrium version of the model diﬀers from that of the
24partial equilibrium version of the model in two ways. First, because the relevant group to
be studied within the model is no longer limited to single mothers, we recalibrate wages,
the job separation rate (δ), unemployment beneﬁts, and IA beneﬁts. We approximate the
low-skill population most likely to be aﬀected by the policy by individuals with less than a
post-secondary level of education. Table 3 presents the values of the calibrated parameters;
we discuss them in more detail below. The calibrated IA beneﬁts equal $695 in British
Columbia.27 The calibrated UI beneﬁt level equals $1,174.
Second, we calibrate the parameters for ﬁrm behavior and equilibrium wage determi-
nation and impose the steady state conditions. The fractions of the relevant population in
each labor force state (A, U, and E) in British Columbia are estimated from the 1993-94
longitudinal wave of the Survey of Labour Income Dynamics (SLID).28 Unlike the LFS, the
SLID has separate data on IA and UI beneﬁt receipt. We adopt the following deﬁnitions
in the data in order to maintain consistency with the model. We deﬁne employed workers
as individuals who are employed in the ﬁrst week of the month and report no UI or IA
beneﬁts during the month. Unemployed workers are deﬁned as individuals who are either
unemployed or not in the labor force and report receiving UI beneﬁts. Finally, IA recipients
are individuals who are either unemployed or not in the labor force and report receiving IA.
We exclude all individuals who do not ﬁt these criteria, such as those who report working
full time and receiving either UI or IA beneﬁts. Similarly, we exclude those reporting that
they are unemployed or not in the labor force, but not receiving any UI or IA beneﬁts.29
Third, we calibrate the match surplus for each of the ﬁrst 48 months of job tenure
27IA beneﬁts by province are provided for the sub-groups of single employable persons, persons with
disabilities, single parents with one child, and couples with two children. We take a weighted average for
these groups, with the weights reﬂecting their size in the IA population. The population shares are based
on those reported for British Columbia in Barrett and Cragg (1998).
28The SLID is the Canadian analogue of the U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation.
2971 per cent of the individuals in the data ﬁt into one of these three mutually exclusive categories. Of
those who do not, 80 per cent report being either unemployed or not in the labor force, but do not report
receiving either UI or IA beneﬁts.
25(S(1)–S(48)), with one additional match surplus for all jobs of a longer duration (S(49)).
We do not directly observe the match surplus; however, we do observe the average wage
for workers with diﬀerent tenure levels in the data. We can therefore use the wage and
tenure information from the LFS for the sample of individuals in British Columbia without
completed post-secondary education to infer the match values in the baseline economy. In
particular, we estimate a wage proﬁle that is cubic in job tenure and then determine the
match values in the model that generate the equilibrium wage proﬁle observed in the data.
It is important to emphasize that we assume the match values S(t), but not wages, are
invariant to policy changes. In particular, the policy changes we consider change the value
of the outside options of workers and ﬁrms, and thus the way the match value is divided,
but not the total value of the match itself.30
The ﬁrst period of employment in the model diﬀers from later periods of employment, as
the model allows starting wages to diﬀer depending on whether the worker’s outside option
is IA or unemployment. However, it is not possible to separate out the starting wages in the
data for individuals with diﬀerent outside options. In the model, all matches are assumed
to have the same match surplus value, but workers may receive diﬀerent wages, as they
face diﬀerent outside options when bargaining with ﬁrms. Therefore, when estimating the
starting wages for workers in each of the ﬁrst ¯ u periods of employment, we restrict the
average of the wage for each month in the model to equal the average wage for a worker
with the corresponding tenure in the data. The cost of posting a vacancy (ξ) is calibrated
so that the value of a vacancy equals zero. The job separation rate (δ), the search cost
elasticity (z), the discount factor (β), the size of the labor force (L) and the vacancy rate
(v) are calibrated as in Section 3.1.
Given ba, bu, L, E, U, A, F, z, δ, β, and data on wages, the baseline model is a system
30This assumption would be invalid if the policy experiments considered involved changing the productivity
of worker-ﬁrm matches.
26of 377 equations and unknowns. Solving the baseline model yields estimates for ca, cu, ξ,
S(1)−S(49), and starting wages w(t,i) for each unemployment insurance eligibility status.31
4.2 The equilibrium model with SSP
In this section we incorporate the SSP program as policy in the model. There are two key
diﬀerences between the partial equilibrium analysis of the last section and the following
simulations. First, all workers and ﬁrms are now aware of the SSP program and will include
this information in their decision making processes; as a result, the SSP program will now
have feedback eﬀects, just as the unemployment insurance and income assistance program
have feedback eﬀects. Second, the Self-Suﬃciency policy now applies to all IA recipients,
rather than just to single parent IA recipients as in the experiment.
Our discussion regarding the implementation of SSP as policy focuses on the three
questions raised in the introduction. First, does an increase in the employment rate for
IA recipients come at the expense of reduced employment for others in the labor market?
Second, what impact does oﬀering an earnings supplement have on the distribution of wages
in the economy? Finally, does the existence of the SSP program delay exit from IA during
the pre-qualifying period? We now discuss the answer to each question in turn.
4.3 The Displacement Eﬀect
The top half of Table 4 presents the expected durations of joblessness. As expected, the
average duration of income assistance spells is substantially reduced under the SSP program,
as SSP-eligible individuals face greater incentives to exit the IA program. The model
predicts a decrease in expected IA duration of approximately 32 days (1.1 months). In
contrast, the expected duration of unemployment spells for those eligible for the maximum
number of months increases by approximately 3 days (0.09 months). In essence, the policy
31Estimates of the match surplus values and wages are available from the authors upon request.
27change increases the likelihood that unemployed workers exhaust their UI beneﬁts and
transit to IA, as unemployed workers are displaced in the labor market by IA recipients.
The total jobless duration increases for those who begin a spell in unemployment, while the
total jobless duration decreases for those exiting employment to IA.
The last two rows of Table 4 indicate that employment rates and vacancies decline in
British Columbia following the introduction of SSP. Employment falls within the model due
to the relationship between wage bargaining and the minimum wage (discussed below). In
particular, because ﬁrms are constrained to pay at least the minimum wage and the value
of IA increases for workers because of the presence of SSP, workers have a higher threat
point. As a result, ﬁrms are not able to extract the surplus introduced by the SSP when
bargaining with workers.
4.4 The Wage Eﬀect
As discussed in Section 3, starting wages diﬀer depending on whether the worker transits
from IA or UI and depending on the length of the unemployment spell. Once the SSP
is in place, starting wages also diﬀer depending on whether the worker is transiting from
an SSP-eligible state. Table 5 displays the average earnings, over the ﬁrst six months of
employment, for workers transiting to employment from selected states. Several patterns
are worth discussion.
First, individuals eligible to receive supplement payments in British Columbia experience
only a 5% (834 − 938/938) reduction in wages. The reason supplement-eligible workers do
not experience large reductions in wages is that ﬁrms are constrained to pay them at least
the minimum wage. The income of workers receiving supplement payments, as a result,
rises substantially: for example, before the policy change an individual in British Columbia
that transited to employment from the ﬁrst period of IA would earn, on average, $938 per
28month over the ﬁrst six months of employment. In contrast, the same worker would expect
to receive $1,989 in earnings and supplement payments if he or she transits to employment
during the ﬁrst month of eligibility for the SSP supplement.
Surprisingly, other workers experience an increase in wages following the introduction
of the SSP. For example, UI recipients who are one month from exhausting beneﬁts receive
starting wages that are 13% higher after the introduction of the SSP program. One’s
initial intuition may be that they should receive a lower wage; the reason they do not is
because supplement-eligible workers do not experience a large decline in wages because of
the minimum wage. As a result, the introduction of the supplement does not result in ﬁrms
receiving a larger share of the match surplus. At the same time, the value of entering IA
has increased due to the introduction of the supplement. As a result, the outside options
of UI recipients and IA recipients who are not eligible to receive the supplement improve.
4.5 Delayed Exit Eﬀects
As discussed earlier, the equilibrium unemployment rate increases slightly with the intro-
duction of the SSP program, the result of a lower re-employment probability for unemployed
workers. The fall in re-employment probabilities for unemployed workers is due in large part
to the fact that unemployed workers exert less search eﬀort after the policy change. The
diﬀerence in search eﬀort for unemployed workers in the baseline and in the model following
the introduction of the Self-Suﬃciency policy is presented in Figure 2. In general, search
eﬀort for unemployed workers increases in the months leading up to unemployment beneﬁt
exhaustion. However, because the value of transiting to IA has increased following the
policy change, search eﬀort for unemployed workers in the SSP world does not rise to the
same extent as it did in the baseline economy. As a result, a larger fraction of unemployed
workers transit from unemployment to IA after the policy change.
29The search behavior of IA recipients also changes following the policy change. Figure 3
compares the survival rates for individuals entering IA in the baseline world and the SSP
world. In the presence of the SSP, the survival rate is higher in the ﬁrst 15 months than
in the base case. This ﬁnding is indicative of the presence of delayed exit eﬀects, due to
the fact that individuals have incentives to remain on IA long enough to become eligible to
receive the supplement. Although survival rates are higher in the ﬁrst 15 months of an IA
spell with the SSP, the subsequent decrease in survival rates that results from the increased
search eﬀort of supplement-eligible IA recipients outweighs the delayed exit eﬀects, as the
average duration of IA spells declines following the imposition of the SSP.
4.6 A Comparison of the Simulated Impacts in Partial Equilibrium and
General Equilibrium
To gauge the importance of general equilibrium eﬀects in the simulated economy, we com-
pare the simulated impacts of the Self-Suﬃciency program in partial equilibrium to the
general equilibrium eﬀects highlighted above. The diﬀerence in survival rates for IA recip-
ients in the partial equilibrium model as compared to the general equilibrium model are
presented in Figure 4. The impact of the policy change is slightly greater in the partial
equilibrium version of the model. This result is not surprising for two reasons. First, wages
do not fall in the partial equilibrium model after the workers become eligible for the sup-
plement. Second, re-employment probabilities do not decline in response to the increased
ﬂow of IA recipients into employment. Both factors are consistent with greater incentives
to exit IA for employment when equilibrium eﬀects are not taken into account. Our results
are consistent with the ﬁndings from the literature discussed in the introduction of smaller
impacts of policy changes when equilibrium eﬀects are taken into account (Davidson and
Woodbury, 1993; Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998). It should be noted that, because
of the assumption of free entry for ﬁrms and constant returns to scale in production, our
30simulation likely captures a lower bound on the general equilibrium eﬀects.
5 Reconsidering the Costs and Beneﬁts of the Self-Suﬃciency
Project
In this section, we look at the beneﬁts of implementing the SSP policy relative to the costs.
To highlight the importance of equilibrium eﬀects, we conduct our cost-beneﬁt analysis
using both the partial equilibrium and the general equilibrium results. Our analysis has
two limitations worth noting. First, SSP was found to have both positive and negative
eﬀects on other variables of interest such as marriage and child outcomes (Michalopoulos et
al., 2002). We ignore outcome variables other than earnings, as they are beyond the scope
of this paper. Second, we do not consider any additional costs or beneﬁts associated with
the process of moving from the baseline steady state to the SSP steady state.
We start with the partial equilibrium cost-beneﬁt analysis. In this case, the following
assumptions are imposed. First, the only individuals who change their behavior in response
to the policy change are those who have been on income assistance for 12 months. Second,
any jobs obtained as a result of the SSP program are ‘new jobs’, leading to an increase
in aggregate output. Finally, wages do not change from the baseline economy. In other
words, we assume that there are no displacement eﬀects, no delayed exit eﬀects, and no
wage eﬀects.
Our cost-beneﬁt analysis, presented in Table 6, draws on SSP program cost information
presented in Michalopoulos et al. (2002). First, we calculate the direct costs of administering
the Self-Suﬃciency policy. Michalopoulus et al. (2002, Table 7.7) estimate that the net
average cost per individual eligible for the SSP program is $1,367. In addition, SSP increases
the costs of administering other transfer programs and generates management information
systems costs totaling $251 per eligible person in British Columbia. In the ﬁrst two columns
31of Table 6, the total program costs for each province are subsequently multiplied by 1.5, an
estimate of the marginal social cost of a tax dollar.32 The estimated cost of SSP program
services weighted by the number of individuals eligible for SSP in the partial equilibrium
version of our model is $128,276 per 1000 individuals in the low-skill population of British
Columbia (hereafter “per 1000”).
Second, we calculate the total value of transfer payments in the baseline economy and in
the economy with the SSP. We multiply the diﬀerence in the value of the transfer payments
by the deadweight loss associated with the taxes necessary to ﬁnance the diﬀerence in
transfers, estimated at 0.5. The deadweight loss of the change in transfer payments is
therefore estimated as $493,144 per 1000.
Third, we calculate total output in the baseline economy and in the economy with the
SSP. In the partial equilibrium version of the model, the value of monthly output increases
after the Self-Suﬃciency policy is introduced. In particular, we predict output to increase,
per 1000, by $2,383,891 in British Columbia after the imposition of the policy change.
Finally, we add the direct costs of the program to the social cost of the net increase in taxes
resulting from the increase in transfers and then subtract the total from the increase in the
value of output. Under these assumptions the SSP program more than pays for itself; there
is a net gain from the program of $1,762,470 per 1000.
The equilibrium eﬀects of the policy change the cost-beneﬁt conclusion drawn from
the partial equilibrium analysis substantially. Performing the same calculations using the
general equilibrium values for output, UI beneﬁt receipt, and IA receipt yields dramatically
diﬀerent cost-beneﬁt estimates. After taking the equilibrium eﬀects into account, the SSP
policy yields a net cost of $1,982,444 per 1000. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of
conducting general equilibrium evaluations of programs, rather than relying solely on the
32See, e.g., Diewert (1988) and Dalhby (1994) for Canada and Browning (1987) for the U.S.
32ﬁndings from partial equilibrium social experiments, to guide policy.
The third and fourth columns of Table 6 present the cost-beneﬁt analysis in the case
where the marginal social cost of a tax dollar equals zero. This comparison provides a lower
bound on the indirect costs of implementing the Self-Suﬃciency Project as a wide-scale
program. Even neglecting the marginal social cost of taxes, our model indicates that in
general equilibrium the beneﬁts of the SSP do not cover its costs.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 7 presents evidence on the extent to which our results are sensitive to the choice of
the discount factor (β) and the elasticity of search costs with respect to search eﬀort (z). It
is worth emphasizing that the search friction parameters ca and cu are re-calibrated in the
baseline model for each combination of β and z. Lower values for β reduce the incentives
of individuals on UI or IA to search as the value of employment falls. Lower values of ca
and cu are required to match the observed transitions into employment from unemployment
and income assistance. A similar argument holds for z. If search costs become more elastic
(a higher value for z), then lower search costs are necessary to match the transition into
employment. The re-calibrated values for ca and cu are presented in the top four rows of
Table 7.
First, we consider the sensitivity of our partial equilibrium measure of the estimated
impact of SSP on income assistance survival rates. For comparison purposes, we also
present the experimental impact constructed from the data. Lowering the discount factor
increases the simulated impact of the policy in partial equilibrium. This occurs because
lower values of ca and cu associated with the decrease in the discount factor result in a
higher exit rate from IA. As search costs become less elastic with respect to search eﬀort,
the shape of the cost function changes such that the simulated IA survival rate is greater
33than its experimental counterpart during the 12 months of supplement eligibility. The
consistency of Davidson and Woodbury’s (1993) estimate of the discount factor and of the
search elasticity parameter estimated by Christensen et al. (2002) with the behavior of
participants in the Canadian SSP is quite striking.
Next, we consider the sensitivity of the general equilibrium program evaluation to
changes in the parameters outlined above. In general, the predicted labor force compo-
sition is relatively insensitive to the changes in parameter estimates, as are the number of
ﬁrms and vacancies. It is also important to note that the cost-beneﬁt conclusions do not
change in any of the speciﬁcations: the partial equilibrium analysis consistently results in
a net gain from the SSP program and the general equilibrium analysis consistently reports
a net loss.
7 Alternative Versions of the Self-Suﬃciency Policy
One of the main advantages to the approach taken in this paper is that we are able to
explore the implications of changing the parameters of the SSP policy within our framework.
To this end, we consider three alternative versions of the policy and simulate the predicted
outcomes of each version in general equilibrium. First, we consider changes in the generosity
of the earnings supplement for eligible income assistance recipients. In particular, we reduce
the earnings ceiling by 25%. Second, we reduce the supplement payment period from 36
months to 12 months. Finally, we require new IA recipients to remain on IA for 24 months,
as opposed to 12, in order to qualify for SSP. Results of each policy experiment are presented
in Table 8.
We ﬁnd that all of the changes we examine improve the cost-beneﬁt performance of
the SSP in general equilibrium without reductions in employment. This ﬁnding results
from reductions in the delayed exit eﬀect: individuals are less willing to exhaust their
34unemployment beneﬁts or to remain on IA for longer periods as SSP becomes less generous.
8 Conclusion
This paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we add to the small
but growing literature that uses structural equilibrium models to study the general equi-
librium eﬀects of labor market interventions. Except in unusual cases, as when a policy is
implemented diﬀerently in separate jurisdictions of suﬃcient number to allow econometric
analysis, estimating general equilibrium eﬀects requires a structural model.
The second contribution is methodological: we show how evidence from social exper-
iments can be used in combination with structural models to perform convincing policy
analysis. In so doing, we extend the literature starting with LaLonde (1986) that uses ex-
perimental data to benchmark non-experimental evaluation estimators. In particular, we
consider the ability of a model, ﬁt to an experimental control group, to match the experi-
mental treatment group as an informal test of the model. Our model passes both versions
of this test. The caveat is that the SSP experiment considered here only allows for direct
testing of the partial equilibrium aspects of the model. Because the Self-Suﬃciency Project
has not been implemented on a wide scale, it is not possible to conduct out-of-sample tests
regarding the general equilibrium eﬀects of the program.33 Nonetheless, our research, to-
gether with the recent paper by Todd and Wolpin (2003), indicates that the combination of
social experiments and structural models of labor market interventions represent a powerful
tool for program evaluation.
The ﬁnal contribution consists of our empirical ﬁndings on the general equilibrium eﬀects
of the SSP. This program represents a special case of a broad class of interventions designed
to“make work pay” for individuals collecting government beneﬁts. Such interventions have
33Alternative experimental designs might capture some general equilibrium eﬀects; we thank Ken Wolpin
for making this point.
35received a great deal of academic and policy attention in recent years. We ﬁnd that equi-
librium wages fall for those treated by the program after the introduction of the earnings
supplement, as workers are willing to accept lower starting wages so as to beneﬁt from the
supplement payments. However, wages of other workers in the economy increase slightly
as the existence of the SSP, along with the minimum wage, increases the threat point of
workers. Furthermore, the simulation results indicate the presence of delayed exit eﬀects,
as a higher fraction of individuals remain on IA to become eligible for the supplement after
the policy change. All these eﬀects have important implications for the cost-beneﬁt per-
formance of the SSP policy; we ﬁnd that taking account of the general equilibrium eﬀects
reverses the cost-beneﬁt calculation from the partial equilibrium experiment.
36Table 1: Summary of Notation
A Steady state number of workers on social assistance
ba Social assistance beneﬁts
bu Unemployment insurance beneﬁts
ca Parameter capturing the disutility of search eﬀort in the
cost of search function for social assistance
cu Parameter capturing the disutility of search eﬀort in the
cost of search function for unemployed
E Steady state number of employed workers
E(t,i) Steady state number of employed
workers eligible for i unemployment insurance beneﬁt months in jobs of tenure t
¯ E Steady state number of workers no longer experiencing wage growth
F Number of ﬁrms (jobs)
L Total labor force
m(0) Conditional probability a social assistance recipient
ﬁnds a job and transits to employment next period
m(i) Conditional probability of re-employment with i
months of unemployment beneﬁts remaining
p(0) Search eﬀort for those on social assistance
p(i) Search eﬀort for the unemployed with i beneﬁt months remaining
q(i) Firm’s probability of meeting a potential worker
with i months of unemployment beneﬁts remaining
S(t) Match surplus for a worker ﬁrm match of tenure t
T Match tenure beyond which match surplus no longer increase
I Number of months required to
qualify for minimum unemployment insurance beneﬁts
u Minimum number of unemployment beneﬁt months
¯ u Maximum number of unemployment beneﬁt months
U Steady state number of workers receiving
unemployment insurance beneﬁts
V Steady state number of vacancies
V A The value function for a worker on social assistance
V E(t,i) The value function for an employed worker in the
tth period of employment with unemployment beneﬁt eligibility i
V U(i) The value function for an unemployed worker with
i months unemployment insurance beneﬁts remaining
w(t,i) The wage for a worker in the tth month of employment
with unemployment eligibility i
w Minimum wage
z The elasticity of search cost with respect to search eﬀort
β Discount factor
δ Exogenous job separation rate
λ The average number of applications ﬁled by workers
at each ﬁrm
ξ The per period cost to a ﬁrm of posting a vacancy
ΠE(t,i) Firms’ expected future proﬁt from a match of tenure t,
with a worker with unemployment eligibility i
ΠV Firms’ value of a current vacancy
37Table 2: Moments and Parameters for Single Mothers without
Completed Postsecondary Education
Income assistance beneﬁts, monthly (ba)1 927






Maximum (¯ u) 10
Average job tenure, months (1/δ)4 46.68
Average hourly wage4 10.65
Average wage, tenure > 48 months 11.12
Wage growth equation w(t) = 7.89 + 0.0891t
−0.000378t2
+6.10e − 7t3
Minimum wage (w)5 5.50
Vacancy rate (V/F)6 3.20
Exogenous job separation rate (δ)7 0.0214
Monthly discount rate (β)8 0.9835
Elasticity of search costs w.r.t eﬀort (z)9 1.8457
Notes: All values are in 1992 Canadian dollars. 1. National Council of Welfare (2002). 2. Unemployment
beneﬁts are based on 55 per cent of average monthly earnings from Labour Force Survey (1997–2000).
3. Information on EI eligibility rules is from Lin (1998). 4. Labour Force Survey (1997–2000). 5. Minimum
wage at the beginning of the the SSP experiment (Michalopoulos 2002). 6. Galarneau et al. (2001), based
on the average for retail trade and consumer services and labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing sectors.
7. Inverse of average job tenure in the Labour Force Survey (1997–2000). 8. This corresponds to an annual
discount rate of 0.82, the rate used for all ﬁgures and tables in Davidson and Woodbury (1993). 9. From
Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, and Wervatz (2002).
38Table 3: Moments and Parameters for the Baseline General Equi-
librium Model
Income assistance beneﬁts, monthly (ba) 695
Unemployment beneﬁts, monthly (bu) 1174
Search costs, income assistance (ca) 0.3281
Search costs, unemployment (cu) 0.0526
Average job tenure, months (1/δ) 72.91
Employment rate (E) 90.15
Unemployment rate (U) 5.80
Income assistance rate (A) 4.05
Average hourly wage 13.14
Average wage, tenure > 48 months 16.14
Exogenous job separation rate (δ) 0.0137
Monthly discount rate (β) 0.9835
Elasticity of search costs w.r.t eﬀort (z) 1.8457
Cost of posting a vacancy (ξ) 9,445
Number of ﬁrms (F) 92.99
Vacancy rate (V/F) 3.20
Notes: See Table 2 for sources.
39Table 4: Labor Force Composition — Baseline and SSP Models
Baseline SSP
Expected UI duration, months 5.07 5.16
Expected IA duration, months 31.03 29.96
Expected jobless duration, months 8.33 8.73
Employment rate 90.15 89.72
Unemployment rate 5.80 5.92
Income assistance rate 4.05 4.36
Number of ﬁrms 93.13 92.67
Number of vacancies 2.98 2.95
Notes: The sources for the the baseline values of the labor force status proportions, number of ﬁrms and
vacancy rate are given in Table 3. All other values are generated by the model.
Table 5: Average Monthly Earnings — First Six Months
Entering employment from: Baseline SSP
Maximum months of UI remaining (U(¯ u)) 2,070 2,085
Last month of UI (U(1)) 972 1,097
First month on IA (A(1)) 967
12th month on IA (A(12)) 987
First month eligible for SSP (SSP(1)) 894
with SSP top-up 1,989
Last month eligible for SSP (SSP(12)) 894
with SSP top-up 1,989
IA, no longer eligible for SSP (A(0)) 938 967
Mean wage 1,563 1,593
SD wage 407 672
Mean income 1,563 1,634
SD income 407 390
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on model simulations.
40Table 6: Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis–SSP Applied to All Income Assis-
tance Recipients
Partial General Partial General
Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium
Marginal Social Cost of 0.5 Marginal Social Cost of 0.0
Direct Costs
SSP program service costs1 1,367 1,367 1,367 1,367
Net SSP admin costs 251 251 251 251
Number eligible for SSP 53 63 53 63
Total Direct Costs 85,517 102,698 85,517 102,698
Adjusted for MSC2 128,276 154,047 85,517 102,698
Indirect Costs
Change in UI Payments 0 95,414 0 95,414
Change in IA Payments –212,553 144,375 –212,553 144,375
Change in SSP Payments 1,198,843 1,648,983 1,198,843 1,648,983
Total Change in transfers 986,289 1,888,772 986,289 1,888,772
Adjusted for MSC3 493,144 944,386 0 0
Change in output 2,383,891 –884,011 2,383,891 –884,011
Net gain from program 1,762,470 –1,982,444 2,298,374 –986,709
Notes: Costs are calculated over ﬁve years for a labor force normalized to 1000. 1. The direct costs are taken
from Michalopoulos et al. (2002, Table 7.7). 2. The direct costs are multiplied by the marginal social cost
(MSC) of a tax dollar, estimated to be 1.5 (Diewert 1988; Dalhby 1994; Browning 1987). 3. The marginal
social cost of the increase in transfers is just the dead weight loss associated with a tax and transfer system:
0.5.
41Table 7: Sensitivity to the Choice of β and z
Parameters Base (PE) Base (GE) Alternative Parameters
Annual discount rate (β) 0.82 0.77 0.87 0.82 0.82
Elasticity of search costs (z) 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.75 2.00
Search costs, income assistance (ca) 0.33 0.26 0.40 0.37 0.28
Search costs, unemployment (cu) 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03
12 Month impact1 −0.178 −0.173 −0.186 −0.159 −0.201 −0.140
35 Month impact −0.123 −0.118 −0.127 −0.108 −0.137 −0.096
Labor force composition
Employment 90.15 89.72 89.63 89.75 89.76 89.76
Unemployment 5.80 5.92 5.96 5.91 5.92 5.90
Income assistance 4.05 4.36 4.41 4.35 4.32 4.34
Firms 93.13 92.67 92.56 92.70 92.72 92.71
Vacancies 2.98 2.95 2.94 2.95 2.96 2.95
Cost–beneﬁt analysis: Net gain from program
Partial equilibrium 1,762 1,919 1,686 1,407 1,645
General equilibrium −1,982 −2,294 −1,905 −1,914 −1,864
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on model simulations. The search friction parameters, ca and cu are
re-calibrated in the baseline model for each combination of β and z. Costs are per capita costs over ﬁve
years. 1. For the 12 and 35 month impacts the values in the Base (PE) column refer to the impacts estimated
using the experimental data. All other values in the table come from model simulations.
42Table 8: Alternative SSP Policy Simulations
Reduced 12 month 24 months
Base supplement payment waiting
Case SSP by 75 % period period
Labor force composition
Employment 90.15 89.72 89.99 89.89 89.87
Unemployment 5.80 5.92 5.85 5.87 5.86
Income assistance 4.05 4.36 4.16 4.23 4.27
Firms 93.13 92.67 92.96 92.85 92.84
Vacancies 2.98 2.95 2.97 2.96 2.97
Cost-beneﬁt: Net gain from program
Partial equilibrium 1,762 2,067 1,505 1,147
General equilibrium −1,982 −923 −1,465 −969
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on model simulations.
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Figure 1: Simulated Partial Equilibrium Impact of SSP. The dotted bands are point wise
95 per cent conﬁdence intervals for the data.
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Figure 2: Search Intensity for Those Starting with Maximum Unemployment Beneﬁts






































































Figure 3: Survival Probability, Starting from Income Assistance







































Figure 4: Survival Probability, Partial and Equilibrium Impacts
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